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The Conciliatory Authority of the Council of the
League of Nations
Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr.*
I
Under Chapter Six of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Security Council is authorized to promote the peaceful settlement
of major international disputes. In practice, the potentials of this
authority have not been fully realized. While this is the result of
varied causes, it is partially due to the attitude of the Great Powers,
permanent members of the Council.' They prefer to utilize tradi-
tional modes of diplomacy to promote settlement,2 especially if one
of the parties to the underlying conflict is a "client" state.,
The Charter has been amended to increase the number of nonper-
manent members so that the Council now reflects a preponderance
of the regions and people of the world.4 Smaller nations represented
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University. Visiting Scholar, 1973-74, Harvard Law School;
B.S., 1954, College of the Holy Cross; J.D., 1957, Boston College; LL.M., 1962, University of
Virginia.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1 provides that the Republic of China, France, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. Since
1971, the People's Republic of China has been recognized as the only lawful representative
of China to the United Nations.
2. The co-sponsorship of the Middle East peace talks at Geneva by the United States and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is illustrative. See, e.g., 2 Report of the Security
Council, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 2, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/9602 (1974). On the general theme of
pacific diplomacy by the Great Powers see W. LEvi, INTERNATIONAL POLITCS ch. 1 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as LEvi]; H. MORGENTHAU, PoLrrics AMONG NATIONS chs. 31-32 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as MORGENTHAU].
3. The term "client" state refers to the factual dependence of small states upon the
economic and military strength of larger states. See generally LEVI, supra note 2.
4. The amendments to U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1 increase the number of nonperma-
nent members from six to ten. Total membership is increased from 11 to 15. The number of
votes required for passage of procedural and non-procedural matters under article 27 of the
Charter is changed from seven to nine. See Schwelb, Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61
of the Charter of the United Nations, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1965). These amendments
became effective August 31, 1965. The "equitable geographical distribution" clause of U.N.
CHARTER art. 23, para. 1 was interpreted by the General Assembly as requiring an allotment
of five nonpermanent seats to African and Asian states. For criticism of the attitudes of Afro-
Asian nonpermanent members in the enlarged Council see R. HISCOCKS, THE SECUirrv
COUNCIL 97-103 (1973).
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on the Council resent the disposition of the Great Powers to restrict
the Council's involvement in dispute settlement. They believe that
the purposes which the Council is designed to promote are being
subverted by the diplomatic practices of the Powers.5 The belief
seems justified; failure to make full use of the Council's corporate
responsibility runs counter to the democratization of the Council's
structures and excludes the wisdom of the less powerful from the
processes of peaceful settlement of disputes.
The authority of the Security Council in the field of peaceful
settlement is difficult to delineate. In the Dumbarton Oaks Propos-
als' dealing with pacific settlement, a direct transition from the
process of conciliation to enforcement was envisioned. Chapter VIII-
B of the Proposals provided that if the Council deems the failure to
settle a dispute to be a threat to the maintenance of international
5. See generally A. LALL, THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN A UNIVERSAL UNITED NATIONS (1971).
Compare the critique of Secretary General Waldheim:
[Tihe idea of maintaining peace and security in the world through a concert of great
Powers, although these Powers obviously have special responsibilities in matters of
peace and security would seem to belong to the nineteenth rather than to the twentieth
century, where the process of technological advance and democratization is producing
a new form of world society. The world order that we are striving to build in the United
Nations must meet the requirements of such a society, and any other system, however
effective in the past, obviously cannot be acceptable, in the long run, to the peoples of
the world. The interests, the wisdom and the importance of the vast majority of
medium and smaller Powers cannot, at this point in history, be ignored in any durable
system of world order.
The United Nations provides, or should provide, the means by which all nations,
great and small, participate on a basis of sovereign equality in the political process of
establishing and maintaining international peace and security, in facing common
problems through cooperation, and in planning and organizing for a better future. The
improvement of great power relations through bilateral diplomacy is certainly of
fundamental importance in this process, but past experience indicates that it needs
to be complemented and balanced by the multilateral diplomacy of the global Organi-
zation as a safeguard against misunderstandings, as a safety valve in critical times and
as an instrument for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.
Introduction to the Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, 27 U.N.
GAOR IA, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8701/Add. 1 (1972). For a formal expression of detente see Basic
Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics, done at Moscow on May 29, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 756
(1972). The Secretary General's hope for unanimity among the Council powers has not been
realized, especially because of Sino-Soviet antagonisms.
6. At the Moscow Conference of October 19-30, 1943, representatives of China, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed on the necessity of establishing a
general international organization at the earliest practicable date. In the late summer, repre-
sentatives of these nations met at Dumbarton Oaks for exploratory conversation. The results
of agreements reached were embodied in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.
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peace and security, "it should take any measures necessary" to
preserve "peace and security in accordance with the principles and
purposes of the organization."7 The distinction between "pacific
settlement" and maintenance of peace first emerged at the San
Francisco Conference.8 It was motivated by a desire on the part of
the drafters to prevent the Council from being empowered to impose
settlements The distinction was reflected in the separate alloca-
tions of Council authority in Chapters Six and Seven of the Charter
of the United Nations. Chapter Six empowers the Security Council
to promote the peaceful settlement of serious disputes. 0 Chapter
Seven authorizes the Council to take action with respect to threats
to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. II The regime
of Chapter Six, which obliges parties to submit to the Council dis-
putes that they have been unable to settle by peaceful means,"2 was
not essentially linked with the power to maintain peace and security
conferred by Chapter Seven.
Little attention has been directed towards comprehending the full
responsibility of the Council under Chapter Six. Yet without such
understanding, it is difficult to determine what legitimacy can be
attached to the diplomacy of the Great Powers, particularly where
a controversy is already under the jurisdiction of the Council. Since
the corporate conciliatory authority of the Security Council reflects
institutional developments traceable to the League of Nations pe-
riod, it may be useful to examine the powers which the Council of
the League exercised in the field of pacific settlement. This prior
experience is particularly valuable; it contains clashes between in-
stitutional authority and power diplomacy which have great rele-
vance to the difficulties being experienced today.
7. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organiza-
tion, ch. VIII-B, reprinted in R. RUsSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNrrIED NATIONS CHARTER 1024
(1958).
8. At the Yalta Conference of February 3-11, 1945, it was agreed that a conference of the
United Nations should be convened at San Fransisco to prepare the Charter of the organiza-
tion along the lines of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The United Nations Conference on
International Organizations met at San Francisco on April 25, 1945. For a general summariza-
tion of the San Francisco conference see R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF TE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER pt. 5 (1958).
9. Id. at 662-64.
10. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38.
11. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.




To put this matter in proper context, it is necessary to first refer
to the regime of peaceful settlement established by the Great Pow-
ers of the nineteenth century under the system known as the Con-
cert of Europe. The failure of that system led to institutionalization
of peacemaking within the League of Nations. Cooperative supervi-
sion over matters of common interest by the Great Powers was de-
rived from the Treaty of Chaumont,'3 in which victorious powers in
the Napoleonic Wars reserved to themselves the authority to concert
together to decide upon the best way to maintain the general stabil-
ity in Europe. In exercising this power, the Concert made territorial
determinations, established and guaranteed the status of states,
resolved controversies, and proclaimed general rules of international
law. It imposed substantive terms of settlement on weaker nations
whose quarrels threatened the general order.
Justifications for the Concert System were debated in the interna-
tional literature of the latter half of the nineteenth century.'" The
Great Powers had established themselves as directors of interna-
tional society, but it was a factual dominance sustained by eco-
nomic and military strength, not rightful authority. For Chrdtien,
a French jurist, the equality of states was the paramount norm;
13. The treaty can be found in 1 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 119, 125 (1841). In
1818, France was formally brought into the Concert by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Novem-
ber 15, 1818, reprinted in 6 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 14 (1835) (French text). For a
discussion of these agreements see E. DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 292 (1920) [hereinafter cited as DICKINSON]; T.J. LAWRENCE, Essay 5, in ESSAYS ON SOME
DISPUTED QUESTIONS IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1885).
On the general history of the balance of power in international politics see MORGENTHAU,
supra note 2, at ch. 4; A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. 5 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as NUSSBAUM]; Q. WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR ch. VI (1942). For a study
concentrating on Westphalia through the Concert period see C. DuPuiS, LE PRINCIPE
D'EQUILIBRE ET. LE CONCERT EUROPEEN (1909) [hereinafter cited as DuPuIS].
Balance or equilibrium assures stability within a social system composed of autonomous
states. If the balance is disturbed, either by outside forces or changes within, an effort is made
to either reestablish the old balance or create a new one. The objective is not to achieve
stability for its own sake, but to create the conditions which preserve the vitality and diversity
of the elements within the system. A need to achieve balance of power in international affairs
arises whenever a plurality of states coexist in a given geographical area. See WRIGHT, supra
at 123-27. The ideal of the Concert was to secure harmony by reducing the tendency of powers
to form opposing blocks and by promoting the conciliatory settlement of differences.
14. See generally DICKINSON, supra note 13; T.J. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW pt. I, ch. 4, §§ 112-14 (6th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as LAWRENCE]; NUSSBAUM, supra
note 13, at 118-96; J. WESTLAKE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 7 (1894).
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neither a single power nor a union of powers had any authority to
control the freedom of smaller states. 5 The majority of jurists, how-
ever, viewed the hegemony of Great Powers as lawful since it was
generally useful. The understandings which the Powers reached,
and the pressures which they exercised, were an expression of the
general interest in peace.S
At the beginning of the twentieth century, what had begun as a
European system had prospects of becoming a World Concert. The
potential for collective supervision over inter-state disputes ex-
panded as the United States, Japan, Italy, and Germany became
Great Powers. Great Power peacekeeping was accepted because the
general society of nations perceived a need for such pacific author-
ity. But it was a qualified or provisional legitimacy: "If they cease
to be useful," one writer warned, "their preeminence will depart
from them."' 7 The failure of the Concert system to prevent the
outbreak of the First World War struck a serious blow to this diplo-
matic method of preserving the general peace.
At the conclusion of the First World War, it was uncertain
whether the responsibility of a Concert of Great Powers would be
sanctioned by the law of nations. At the peace conferences of 1919,
the victorious allies were given, among other advantages, perma-
nent seats in the Council of the League of Nations. Some jurists
15. Chr~tien observed:
Les grandes Puissances . . . tendent ... A transformer en autorit6 de droit
l'autorit6 de fait qui ne peut manquer d'4tre Ia consequence de Ia superioritd de leurs
forces militaires et de leurs richesses. C'est pr~cis~ment en ce faisant qu'elles violent
manifestment le principe de '6galit6 juridique des Ftats.
A. CHRTIEN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 175 (1893).
Nys, too, suggested that the concert of the Great Powers was a political product: "[Lies
grandes puissances ne sont ni le tribunal ni le pouvior ex~cutif d'une organisation interna-
tionale; leur 'concert,' leur 'accord' est un produit de la politique." 2 E. Nvs, LE Daorr
INTERNATIONAL 199 (1905). For an historical contrast, compare E. Nvs, E]TUDES DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT POLITIQUE (1901), with Dupuis, supra note 13, at ch. 11. For more
favorable French assessment of the basis for the authority of the Great Powers see PILLET,
RECHIkRCHES SUR LES DRorrs FONDAMENTAUX DES 9TATS, 5 REVUE G6N .RALE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PuBuc 66, 70-71 (1898).
16. "[Tlhe hopelessness of resistance in those circumstances has led to an express or
tacit, but peaceable, acceptance of the decrees by the states concerned." 1 J. WESTLAKE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (1910). "[Wlhat is political is legal also, if it is generally accepted
and acted upon." LAWRENCE, supra note 14, pt. II, ch. 4, § 114, at 276. See T.E. HOLLAND,
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (1898).
17. LAWRENCE, supra note 14, pt. II, ch. 4, § 114, at 279. For a study of the general decline
of the Concert and the crisis that developed in 1913-14 see R.B. MOWAT, THE CONCERT OF
EUROPE chs. 24-26 (1930).
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viewed this as a vindication of the Concert principle. The important
position and influence of the Great Powers now had a legal basis:
their concurrent pacific action would be a matter of right and not
just a product of superior strength." But the Powers' special respon-
sibility for keeping the peace was only acknowledged by permanent
representation on an organ of the League. It was not an endorsement
of any general political predominance. The drafting of the League
Covenant demonstrated that the victorious powers were expected to
share a collective responsibility with other member nations on the
Council to maintain the general peace. This policy determination
was not made, however, until the rejection of several organizational
plans.
A British draft for a League of Nations provided for conferences
to review the general condition of international relations, giving
specific attention to difficulties which might threaten the peace.
The victorious states, together with others recognized by them as
Great Powers, would meet annually; quadrennial meetings would be
held by all states included in the League."9 President Wilson pro-
posed an Executive Council consisting of representatives of the
Great Powers and representatives drawn in annual rotation from
two panels: one made up of representatives of states ranking next
after the Great Powers, the other representing "minor" states. The
number drawn from these panels would be one less than the number
of Great Powers. Three or more negative votes in the Council would
operate as a veto.
A later combined British-American draft provided that represent-
atives of states which were members of the League and directly
affected by matters within the sphere of action of the League should
meet as an executive council "from time to time as occasion may
require." This idea was reflected in the proposed Article III of the
League Plan which stated that the United States, Great Britain,
France, Italy, and Japan-the major powers-would be deemed to
be directly affected by all matters of the League. Invitations would
18. The predominant position of the Great Powers was one of the principles upon which
the political institutions of the League were founded, a primacy admitted as of right. Barker,
The Doctrine of Legal Equality of States, 4 BaRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1923). The political
hegemony of the Great Powers was given a legal basis in the League Covenant. I L. OPPEN-
HEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
19. This was the Cecil Plan of January 14, 1919, discussed in 2 D. MILLER, THE DRAFTING
OF THE COVENANT 61 (1928).
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be sent to any power whose interests were directly affected in any
particular situation, and no decision taken at any meeting would be
binding on a state that was not invited to be represented at the
meeting. 0 This proposal was unacceptable to smaller states. They
would be unable to participate in the settlement of disputes since,
by definition, they would be parties to the disputes under considera-
tion during their attendance on the Council. The practical result
would be that all decisions would be made by the Great Powers. The
Executive Council would not be an organ of a League of Nations; it
would be an organ of five nations to which every one must submit.2"
Attention was then directed towards a draft prepared by M. Or-
lando of Italy which envisioned a council consisting of the five major
powers and two representatives of other states that were members
of the League. It was finally agreed that a majority position could
be assured to the Great Powers by a five to four ratio. The theory
which was finally embodied in Article Four of the Covenant was
that the Council should consist of five permanent members possess-
ing general interests and four nonpermanent members with "limited
interests" who would be representatives of the assembly and elected
by it. If other Great Powers were admitted, it was understood that
some provison should be made for representation of the smaller
nations. In fact, the failure of the United States to ratify the Cove-
nant meant that the Council began its work with an equal number
of large and small powers. In 1922, the nonpermanent seats were
raised by two; thereafter, the smaller powers remained a majority.12
The Council of the League was to function, in principle, on the
20. Myers, Representation in League of Nations Council, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 689 (1926).
21. Id. at 695. It should be noted that jurists who had found the Concert system unaccept-
able did not propose equality as a remedy. The Scottish jurist, James Lorimer, suggested,
for example, that for purposes of international organization, the size, government, material
strength, and level of civilization of each state should be taken into account and its political
position determined by the relative weight of such criteria. J. LORIMER, INSTITUTES OF THIE LAW
OF NATIONS 182 (1883). These principles were influential at the time of the First World War.
See Brown, The Theory of the Independence and Equality of States, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 305
(1915). Inequalities in the general structure of the League are examined in DICKINSON, supra
note 13, at 337.
22. Nonpermanent membership was raised to six in 1922, nine in 1926, ten in 1933 and
11 in 1936. Germany became a permanent member in 1926; the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, in 1934. Following withdrawal from the League by Germany and Japan, the
Council was composed of four permanent and 11 nonpermanent members. See generally
ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (19th rev. ed. 1939). The Soviet Union was
excluded from the League in December, 1939, following her attack on Finland.
1976-77
Duquesne Law Review
basis of unanimity. Rather than an institutional expression of the
dominance of Great Powers, the Council was to be an organ of
collective conciliation. Its goal was to prevent war by promoting the
peaceful settlement of international disputes. This theory of pacific
settlement constituted a fundamental change in international rela-
tions; under the Covenant, member states assumed an obligation to
submit serious, nonjusticiable disputes to the mediation of the
Council of the League. 3 The modalities of peaceful settlement were
expected to be significantly different from what they had been dur-
ing the period of the Concert of Europe.
The Council is something more than a diplomatic conference;
it is not an assemblage of Powers, bound by no law, each one
striving to obtain some particular or selfish advantage: when
Foreign Ministers sit at the Council table they do not merely
represent their own countries, they assume special responsibili-
ties, as members of the executive council of the League, and
are each, great and small, equally subject to the laws and prin-
ciples of the Covenant .... 11
During the first decade of its existence, the Council took preven-
tive measures under Article 11(1) of the Covenant where disputes
involved war or the threat of war 5 and assumed jurisdiction over
disputes "likely to lead to a rupture" within the meaning of Article
15. 16 Historians of the period refer to the pervasive influence of
power politics upon the work of the League, noting the testimony
of delegates from smaller states that, despite the juridical composi-
23. Under LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 12, members states undertook to submit
disputes "likely to lead to a rupture" to arbitration, judicial settlement, or to inquiry by the
League Council. See Covenant of the League of Nations with Amendments in Force, June
26, 1945, reprinted in L. GooDIucH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 555 (2d
rev. ed. 1949).
24. T.P. CONWELL-EvANS, THE LEAGUE COUNCIL IN ACTION 253 (1929) [hereinafter cited as
CONWELL-EVANSI.
25. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 11, para. 1 provided:
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the
League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the
League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the
peace of nations.
26. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, para. I declared:
If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a
rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement. . . the Members
of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council.
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tion of the Council, no serious disputes were actually resolved with-
out an agreement among the Great Powers. 7 If such remarks are
uncritically accepted, they can obscure the evolution of the institu-
tional authority of the Council. The support of the Great Powers was
essential to the Council's effectiveness, but the Council was not
their agent. During this period, the Council established its indepen-
dent authority. The development of this authority distinguished the
League's institutional machinery for the pacific settlement of dis-
putes from the methods of traditional diplomacy.
III
The gradual evolution of the Council's authority vis-a-vis the di-
plomacy of the Great Powers can be first seen in its relationship to
the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers and the Conference of
Ambassadors, a subsidiary organ established by these powers to
supervise the execution of the peace treaties. Some cases submitted
to the Council of the League involved the concurrent jurisdiction of
the Supreme Council and were ultimately resolved by the Supreme
Council. In the Polish-Lithuanian dispute over Vilna, an armistice
arrangement worked out by the Council was ineffective and the
dispute was finally resolved by the Allied Powers. 8 But where agree-
ment could not be reached on the frontier between Germany and
Poland in the region of Upper Silesia, the Supreme Council of the
Allied Powers submitted the matter to the League Council, asking
it to make recommendations and agreed to "solemnly undertak[e]
to accept the solution recommended by the Council of the
League." 9 Submissions were also received from the Conference of
Ambassadors. 1
A serious conflict of jurisdiction arose between the Council of the
League and the Conference of Ambassadors in the famous Corfu
27. E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939, at 104 (2d ed. 1946).
28. For a discussion of the Vilna dispute see CONWELL-EVANS, supra note 24, at 89-100;
P.CORBE r, LAW IN DIPLOMACY 191-95 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CORSErr].
29. CONWELL-EVANS, supra note 24, at 203 n.1. Compare id. at 201-10, with CORBETT, supra
note 28, at 200-02. The former is critical, placing emphasis on the close realtionship between
the Committee of the Council and the interested powers.
30. The Conference of Ambassadors submitted four disputes to the Council of the League.
Great Britain submitted a dispute with France under LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15,
para. 1, concerning the Tunis Nationality decrees. Under article three of the Treaty of Lau-
sanne, the question of Mosul sovereignty was submitted to the League by Great Britain and
Turkey. For a list of disputes submitted during the first decade of the League's existence see
CONWELL-EVANS, supra note 24, at app. II.
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incident of 1923. The manner in which it was resolved revealed
important differences between authoritative competence and de
facto power. The conflict began when an Italian member of a bound-
ary commission appointed by the Conference of Ambassadors to
delimit the border between Greece and Albania was murdered on
Greek territory. The Conference demanded that the guilty parties
be punished. Greece invited the Conference to send in its investiga-
tors and agreed to accept their conclusions. The Italian dictator
Mussolini, however, demanded that Greece immediately accept res-
ponsiblity. Greece refused, offering instead to submit the matter to
the League Council. The dictator replied by bombarding and oc-
cupying Corfu. The Greek government then appealed to the Council
under Articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant. Mussolini rejected the
Council's authority and threatened to withdraw from the League.
Under pressure, he accepted the jurisdiction of the Conference of
Ambassadors.
At the time, the League Council consisted of representatives of
the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Belgium, China,
Sweden, Brazil, and Uruguay. Except for the Italian and French
representatives, all accepted the Council's competence. The
Council's position was difficult. It could not deny the right of the
Conference to establish the responsibility for the murder of its
agents, yet it could not acquiesce in the repudiation of its own
authority. At the suggestion of the British representative, a state-
ment of appropriate lines of settlement was approved and conveyed
to the Conference of Ambassadors. In substance, these terms were
proposed by the Conference to Greece and accepted by that govern-
ment. Mussolini refused the proposals, which would have had the
issue of Greek responsibility determined by inquiry and the issue of
indemnity decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Concerned that the annexation of Corfu would disturb the balance
of power, the Conference acceded to the show of force, ordering
Greece to pay a substantial indemnity.3'
The Corfu incident was a defeat for the Council, but it served to
distinguish the Council's authority as independent of international
politics. It did not submit to Italian demands that it was without
jurisdiction, a position later vindicated by the report of a special
31. See J. BARROS, THE CORFU INCIDENT OF 1923 (1965); CONWELL-EVANS, supra note 24,
at 73-81; CORBETT, supra note 28, at 195-200.
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commission of jurists.32 While the Conference of Ambassadors had
a legitimate competence, its decision was clearly unjust. It carried
none of the moral force which had sustained actions of the Great
Powers during the Concert period of the nineteenth century. And,
it signaled a disposition to settle international differences on the
basis of political considerations, a disposition to act outside the
institutions of the League. This tendency would reach its height in
the Locarno period.
The execution of the Locarno treaties was preceded by the failure
of the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes of 1924. The Geneva Protocol, in attempting to close "the
gaps" of the Covenant of the League of Nations,3 would have in-
creased the authority of the Council under Article 15. It was pro-
posed that if the Council could not effect a settlement of a dispute,
it should seek to persuade the parties to submit to either judicial
settlement or arbitration. Failing that, arbitration could be insti-
gated at the request of one party. If none of these circumstances
occurred, the Protocol envisioned a reconsideration of the dispute
by the Council. Signatory states would be committed to comply
with recommendations contained in a report agreed to by all Coun-
cil members other than the representatives of any of the parties to
the dispute. A final clause of compulsory arbitration covered the
contingency of a nonunanimous report.3'
The Locarno treaties, by contrast, reduced the peacemaking au-
thority of the Council. The treaties substituted an elaborate system
of concilation for the Council's direct pacific authority. The primary
treaty, that of mutual guarantee between the five European powers,
was designed to settle Germany's western boundaries. While the
Council had immediate authority in cases of armed aggression,
32. See CORBETT, supra note 28, at 198-99.
33. A "gap" existed under the League Covenant because the modes of peaceful settlement
provided by the Covenant were not conclusive. Under LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 12,
para. 1, the members were obliged to submit disputes between them "likely to lead to a
rupture" to arbitration, judicial settlement, or inquiry, and agreed further not to resort to
war until three months after arbitral award, judicial decision, or report by the Council. See
also LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 13, para. 4; id. art. 15, paras. 6-7.
34. Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, approved by the Assem-
bly of the League of Nations, October 2, 1924, reprinted in 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 22 (Supp. 1925).
Under article two of the Protocol the states would agree not to resort to war except in resisting
acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the
League. See generally Shotwell, Security, in PIONEERS IN WORLD ORDER 26 (H. Davis ed. 1944).
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other quesions which could not be settled by diplomacy would be
submitted either to judicial decision or to a conciliation commis-
sion. The Council's jurisdiction under Article 15 would arise only if
the proposals of the commission were not accepted by the two par-
ties.35
In the so-called arbitration conventions of Locarno, the Coun-
cil's authority was equally remote. A permanent Conciliation Com-
mission was to be established which could consider legal disputes
before their submission to judicial or arbitral decision. All other
disputes between the parties which could not be settled by diplo-
macy were to be submitted to the Conciliation Commission. If no
agreement was reached within a month following the Commis-
sioner's report, the question could, at the request of either party, be
brought before the Council.
There were important political justifications for the Locarno
agreement. 6 It allayed France's fears for its security, and it provided
for Germany's entry into the League and gave her a permanent seat
on the Council. But there were also divisive consequences. The Lo-
carno powers used Council sessions to hold meetings among them-
selves, a practice resented by other representatives to the Council
who feared that the authority which belonged to the whole body
might be usurped. The expressed fears were not without foundation:
If the meetings of the Locarno powers (colloquially known in
Geneva as Locarno tea parties) had been limited, as was
claimed, to the consideration of questions which concerned the
participants alone, they would have been open to no objection.
But in fact they were not so limited. They were used to discuss
matters of general interest to the whole League, such as that
of the relations between the Western powers and Russia. They
were used for preliminary negotiation on questions which were
on the agenda of the Council. They were even used, on occa-
sion, for preventing the submission to the League of affairs
which might embarrass one or another member of the group.
35. Treaty of Mutual Guarantee Between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and
Italy, Annex A of the Locarno Conference, done at Locarno, Oct. 16, 1925, reprinted in 20
AM. J. INT'L L. 21 (Supp. 1926). The jurisdiction of the Council was immediately engaged
under article four in the treaty in case of aggression.




. . . The result was naturally a loss of corporate sentiment in
the Council, and a loss of cohesion as between the Secretariat
and the delegations. Most serious of all, the Covenant itself
seemed to be in danger of oblivion. The Locarno group was to
some extent a reembodiment of the old Concert of Europe; it
reached its conclusions, not by respecting the principles, nor by
using the methods, of the League, but by finding diplomatic
compromises between the wishes and interests of the Great
Powers.37
The diplomacy of Locarno failed in its pacific objectives. The
defiance of the Covenant by Italy and Japan could not be stemmed;
attempts at compromise, such as the HoareLLaval Plan to settle the
Ethiopian conflict, only accelerated the decline of the League dur-
ing the 1930's. Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland brought a
Council judgment that the Locarno treaties had been violated, but
by then there was no moral basis upon which to build common
action under the League Covenant. 8
IV
The revival of Great Power diplomacy not only contributed to the
decline of the League, it also eclipsed the potential growth of the
Council as a collective organ of pacific settlement. Under Article 15
of the Covenant, the Council was responsible to endeavor to effect
settlement of disputes submitted to its authority. In exercising this
competence, it had developed a wide range of procedures, including
commissions of inquiry and submission of issues to the Permanent
Court of Justice for Advisory Opinions, as well as the more direct
methods of diplomacy and good offices used to promote negotiations
between the parties. These institutional innovations constituted an
important advance in the theory and practice of conciliation.
Under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,19 provision was
37. F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 341 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
WALTERS]. But see G. ScoTT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ch. 9 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Scor].
38. The decline of the League is documented in WALTERS, supra note 37, at pt. IV. See
also ScoTr, supra note 37, at pt. 2.
39. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899, arts. IX-XIV,
reprinted in 2 W. MALLOY, TREATIES 2016, 2022 (1910). Convention for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes of 1907, arts. IX-XXXVI, reprinted in 2 W. MALLOY, TREATIES 2220,
2230-34 (1910). The basic article in both conventions, article IX, stated that inquiry was
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made for the International Commissions of Inquiry which would
have been empowered to make impartial investigations of disputed
facts. Under the Bryan Plan of 1913,40 such commissions had author-
ity to consider the factual aspects of all nonjusticiable issues be-
tween the contending parties. But such commissons would only be
empowered to carry out their investigations and make their reports
to the governments involved; these governments were then at liberty
to disregard them. Moreover, conciliation commissions were rarely
empowered to make recommendations concerning terms of settle-
ment."
The methods of conciliation developed by the Council displayed
a marked improvement over earlier efforts. Under Article 15 of the
League Covenant, members were obliged to submit to the Council
disputes "likely to lead to a rupture" which were not submitted to
arbitration or judicial settlement. The Council was obliged to en-
deavor to effect a settlement,42 and no limit was placed upon the
methods which the Council could use to fulfill its obligation. As a
constitutional body in regular session, the Council had broad power
to choose commissions best suited to the varied tasks of investiga-
tion for which it was responsible once its jurisdiction had been en-
gaged. And, it would authorize the commissions to make recommen-
dations or proposals based upon ascertained facts. Such recommen-
dations, if adopted by the Council, could then be used by it as a
basis for inducing the parties to reach a settlement. 3
deemed suitable for disputes "involving neither honour nor vital interests" and arising from
a difference of opinion on points of fact.
40. The Bryan Plan refers to treaties of pacific settlement negotiated by Secretary of State
William J. Bryan which provided for the use of commissions of inquiry to facilitate
settlement of dispute. The treaty with Guatemala for the Advancement of Peace, Sept. 20,
1913, 38 Stat. 1840, T.S. No. 598 (reprinted in 3 W. MALLOY, TREATIES 2666 (1923)) is a prime
example. See 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 558 (1945).
41. Under the terms of the treaty concerning boundary waters between the United States
and Canada of January 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548, the International Joint Commis-
sion was empowered by article nine of the treaty to investigate and report on the facts and
to accompany its report with "such conclusions and recommendations as it may deem appro-
priate." Hyde, The Place of Commissions of Inquiry and Conciliation Treaties in the Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 96 (1929). See also 2 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 557-58(B) (2d rev. ed. 1945).
42. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, para. 3.
43. M.O. HUDSON, By PACIFIC MEANS 28 (1935). When disputes were amenable to objective
examination, the Council either established commissions of inquiry which would investigate
the facts and formulate a proposed settlement, or, with the consent of the parties, requested
an advisory opinion from the Permanent Court of International Justice on the substantial
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Where the underlying controversy touched vital interests, the
Council used its direct authority in a manner which represented an
advance over traditional diplomatic methods. Acting as a body, or
through mediating committees, the Council used its discretionary
powers in an effort to persuade the parties to reach a new political
accommodation. This was a form of diplomacy by conference." Its
success required a corporate sense of responsiblity for peace, sub-
stantial objectivity on the part of interested members, and the ac-
tive participation of neutral states.
Following Locarno, these progressive developments in pacific
settlement declined. The Kellogg-Briand Pact,"5 renouncing war as
a means of settling disputes, did not strengthen the Council's au-
thority and increased emphasis was placed upon the establishment
of conciliation procedures outside the jurisdiction of the League."
As the authority of the Council diminished it lost the ability to
maintain supervision over serious disputes. These conflicts were
being continually absorbed into the processes of international poli-
tics.
V
In the years immediately following the establishment of the
United Nations in 1945, the Security Council, as a principle organ
of the world body, exercised the conciliatory authority conferred
matters in dispute. In "political" controversies, in which there was a need to formulate a new
regime of rights and duties, the Council invoked its conciliatory authority, seeking, as a body
or through committees, to directly induce the parties to negotiate a fresh agreement. The role
of the rapporteur was important; he would maintain contact with the disputant parties and,
recommend different courses of action to the Council at various stages of the dispute.
CONWELL-EvANS, supra note 24, at pt. 3, ch. 7; J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLicr 168-75 (rev. ed. 1959).
44. For an illustration of Council diplomacy by conference see the summary of the Hun-
garian Optant dispute in CONWELL-EVANS, supra note 24, at 185-200. Diplomacy by conference
refers to the corporate activities of the Council.
45. Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S.
57.
46. Brierly was critical of the conciliation provisions in the Geneva General Act for the
Pacific Settlement of Disputes, General Act of Arbitration of September 26, 1928, 93 L.N.T.S.
342, which he saw as detracting from the authority of the Council. The regularity of Council
sessions, the fact that its members had responsibilities to the world at large, and the flexibil-
ity of its methods made it a superior instrument for the pacific settlement of disputes. By
making Council authority remote or residual, the General Act contained the same weakness




upon it by Chapter Six of the Charter. It utilized its power of inves-
tigation," appointed mediators, encouraged parties to serious dis-
putes to continue negotiations, and made appropriate recommenda-
tions.4" The Council understood its authority as including the right
to require from the parties an accounting of the progress being made
towards a final settlement of their differences. 9 In doing so, it ex-
tended the processes of corporate responsibility for the promotion
of the peaceful settlement of disputes which was begun by the Coun-
cil of the League of Nations.
Yet the potentials for the development of corporate conciliation
have not been fully developed by the present Council. The absence
of a corporate disposition within the Council towards the settlement
of serious disputes has led to a chronic dependence upon peacekeep-
ing forces without a corresponding progress towards final resolution
of the underlying conflicts. The Cyprus conflict provides a tragic
illustration of the Security Council's failure to fully use its concilia-
tory authority. In 1971, after mediation efforts had failed, the Secre-
tary General urged the Council to use its influence and become more
directly involved in assisting the parties to overcome their basic
differences. Referring to Greek Cypriot fear of partition and Turkish
Cypriot fear of enosis50 he urged the Council to take affirmative
steps to conciliate the dispute:
It seems to me that if the Security Council were able in some
way to assist the parties in dispelling the difficulties created by
these two ideas [i.e., fear of partition and fear of enosis] and
in doing so, to reaffirm its own determination to ensure that a
just settlement was reached in Cyprus within the principles of
the Charter and the spirit and letter of its resolutions on the
subject a great improvement in the atmosphere of the talks
. . . might result.
47. See U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
48. See U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 1; id. art. 37, para. 2.
49. In the Soviet-Iranian dispute of 1946, the Council, noting the parties' willingness to
settle the matter by a renewal of negotiations, requested them to inform the Council of any
results achieved and reserved the right to request information on the progress of negotiations.
1 U.N. SCOR, 1st. ser., No. 1, at 70 (1946). See also the resolution on the Indonesia case in 2
U.N. SCOR, 1703 (1947). For a general review of the positive exercise of conciliatory authority
by the Security Council see Murphy, The Obligation of States to Settle Disputes by Peaceful
Means, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 57 (1973).
50. "Enosis" refers to union with Greece.
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• . .[Wihen the United Nations has been involved in this
problem for so many years and with considerable expenditure
both of effort and resources . . .the Security Council should
become more actively involved in assisting the parties in the
search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.
On some of the basic issues it seems to me that the Council's
advice, guidance and new initiatives, of course with the agree-
ment of the parties, would be a reassuring and constructive
element in their efforts to reach a settlement. It would be, of
course, for the Council itself to consider how best it may play
a role.'
The Council did not act and the consequences were catastrophic.
Any authentic revival of the Security Council's authority in the
peacemaking field will require it to make a more vigorous use of its
conciliatory authority and to distinguish its responsibility from the
modalities of world politics. A greater awareness of the work of the
Council of the League of Nations is indispensable to that objective.
At the beginning of the League period, it was realized that the
peaceful settlement of international disputes could only be realized
if the Council became "something more than a diplomatic confer-
ence"52 and if its members were committed to the pacific objectives
of the world community. The Corfu incident demonstrated that an
international peacemaking body must distinguish its authority from
the exigencies of power diplomacy if it hopes to maintain its integ-
rity.
The history of the League after Locarno demonstrates the futility
of efforts to settle international disputes outside an institutional
framework. It is a lesson which the present world community has
not fully understood. International conferences convened outside
the United Nations failed to peacefully settle the Indochina con-
flict; 53 it is still expected that the Middle East problem can be
51. Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, U.N.
Doc. 5/10401, at 36 (1971).
52. See CONWELL-EVANS, supra note 24, at 253.
53. The 1954 Geneva Conference, the 1962 Conference on Laos and Cambodia, and the
International Conference on Vietnam (Paris peace talks) of 1973, were all traditional diplo-
matic conferences. All failed to the extent that they sought to bring about peaceful change.
The Act Concerning the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-
nam, done at Paris on March 2, 1973, was signed in the presence of the Secretary General of
the United Nations. See the text of the Act reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATEMALS 392 (1973).
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resolved within a conference context, with the Great Powers acting
as supreme mediators."4
Those who forget the mistakes of the past are bound to repeat
them.
54. The co-sponsorship of the Middle East peace talks at Geneva by the United States
and the Soviet Union was characterized as joint good offices made available to the parties as
a means of facilitating the negotiation process. Report of the Security Council, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 2, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/9602 (1974).
